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STUDENT MATERIAL
Case Comment

Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel:
REFINING THE REGULATION OF ATTORNEY
ADVERTISING
I.

INTRODUCTION

For the better part of this century, the traditional rules governing attorney advertising condemned the activity as a form of commercialization of the profession'
which could only lead to a decline in the legal profession's status of high public
regard and confidence. 2 At common law, advertising and solicitation by attorneys3
were viewed with contempt and sanctioned by prohibitions against barratry,
champerty, 4 and maintenance.' From 1908 until 1977, the American Bar Association was instrumental in the promulgation of statutes in every state for the proscription of lawyer advertising. 6 Only in recent years has attorney advertising been
permitted due to the extension of first amendment protection for commercial speech.
In 1977, the United States Supreme Court decided Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona,' in which the majority held that certain disciplinary rules prohibiting the
advertisement of fees charged by attorneys for routine services were unconstitutional.' In the words of one analyst, Bates "struck the American Bar like a thunderH. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 210-12 (1953).
2

AMERICAN

BAR ASSOCIATION,

OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND

GRIEVANCES 4 (1931). In Opinion 1, drafted January 15, 1924, the Committee stated that -[a]ny conduct that tends to commercialize or bring 'bargain counter' methods into the practice of the law, lowers
the profession in public confidence and lessens its ability to render efficiently that high character of
service to which the members of the profession are called." See also H. DRINKER, supranote 1, at 213 n.14.
"Barratry" is defined as "[tihe offense of frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels and suits,
either at law or otherwise." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 137 (5th ed. 1979). See generally Note, Maintenance
By Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 62-75 (1935).
"Champerty" is defined as "[a] bargain by a stranger with a party to a suit, by which such
third person undertakes to carry on the litigation at his own cost and risk, in consideration of receiving,
if successful, a part of the proceeds or subject sought to be recovered." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
209 (5th ed. 1979). See generally Note, supra note 3, at 64-67.
' "Maintenance" is defined as "[an] officious intermeddling in a suit which in no way belongs
to one, by maintaining or assisting either party, with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend it."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 860 (5th ed. 1979). See generally Note, supra note 3.
6 L. Andrews, Lawyer Advertising and the First Amendment, 1981 Am. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH
J. 967, 968. See also Note, In Re R.M.J.: Reassessing the Extension of First Amendment Protection
to Attorney Advertising, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 729 nn.2, 4, 5 (1983).
' In re Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 555 P.2d 640 (1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Bates v. State
Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1976).
8 Id.
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bolt." 9 The decision of Bates represented the Court's first deviation from an enduring standard of professional legal conduct. It signaled an end to the persistent
notion that the commercial promotion of a law practice is scandalous. It also put
the profession on notice that its members had entered a new era of informational
responsibility, with the enhanced obligation to truthfully advise the public of legal
rights.
Zauderer v. Office of DisciplinaryCounsel" followed a logical progression of
Supreme Court cases commencing with Bates. In Zauderer, the Court reaffirmed
the idea that attorney advertising is protected commercial speech and can only be
regulated by states to insure that such advertising is not false, misleading, or deceptive." The Court in Zauderer held that a state's prophylactic bans on unsolicited
legal advice and illustrations contained in print advertisements were
unconstitutional.'

2

This comment will discuss the prior case law which led to the Court's holding
in Zaudererand the subsequent contribution to the present state of the commercial
speech doctrine. It will also analyze the various issues that the Court continues
to struggle with in its attempts to define what is proper lawyer advertising.

II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The appellant, Philip Q. Zauderer, is a practicing attorney in Ohio. In 1981,
Zauderer chose to promote his practice of law in Columbus by the use of advertisements placed in newspapers of local circulation. The appellant ran two advertisements in a number of Ohio newspapers, the first of which notified the reader
that his firm was available to provide counsel for defendants charged with drunken
driving. This first advertisement, placed in a Columbus newspaper, stated that the
client's "[flull legal fee [would be] refunded if [the client was] convicted of DRUNK
DRIVING."' 3 Two days after the advertisement first appeared, Zauderer was
notified by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio
(hereinafter appellee) that the advertisement appeared to offer contingent-fee representation in criminal cases, which would be an arrangement in violation of Disciplinary Rule 2-106(c) of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility.' 4 Zauderer
subsequently withdrew the advertisement and by correspondence with the Disciplinary
Counsel apologized for the error and indicated his intention to refuse representation
5
of any persons answering the ad.'
9 Boden, Five Years After Bates: Lawyer Advertising in Legal and Ethical Perspective, 65 MARQ.
L. REV. 547, 554 (1982).
,oZauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 10 Ohio St. 3d 44, 461 N.E.2d 883 (1984), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 53 U.S.L.W. 4587 (U.S. May 28, 1985).
1 Zauderer, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4595.
12 Id.
IId. at 4588.
Id.
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In 1982, Zauderer placed a second advertisement in thirty-six Ohio newspapers

which indicated his desire to represent women injured through use of the Dalkon
Shield Intrauterine Device.'

6

In this advertisement, Zauderer included a line draw-

ing of the device and posed the question, "Did you use this IUD?" The advertisement informed the reader that the Dalkon Shield was allegedly responsible for serious

injuries to some of its users.' 7 It also stated that the cases would be handled on
a contingent-fee basis and "[i]f there is no recovery, no legal fees are owed by
our clients."'"

Zauderer was able to attract 106 clients with the second advertisement but also
inspired the Disciplinary Counsel to file a complaint alleging violations of the

disciplinary rules arising from the drunken driving and Dalkon Shield advertisements.
Among the violations alleged in the complaint, it was asserted that the appellant's

drunken driving advertisement offended a rule prohibiting the inclusion of "false,
fraudulent, misleading and deceptive" information.' 9 The appellee based this allega-

tion of deception on the notion that Zauderer had offered contingent-fee representation to persons charged with a criminal offense, which violated a disciplinary

rule prohibiting such an arrangement. The Dalkon Shield advertisement allegedly
violated numerous provisions of the disciplinary rules, including a prohibition on

the use of illustrations, " restrictions against unrequested solicitation for employment," and a requirement to disclose important information regarding contingent22
fee arrangements.
16 The Dalkon Shield Intrauterine Device is a form of contraception which is placed in the cavity
of the womb and "is thought to interfere with implantation of the embryo." URDANG DICTIONARY
OF CURRENT MEDICAL TERMS 220 (1981) (quoted in Zauderer, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4588 n.2). The Dalkon
Shield was first introduced in the early 1970s but was removed from the market in 1974 after it was
believed to be hazardous to the user. Zauderer, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4588 n.2.
" The information included in the ad stated the following:
The Dalkon Shield Interuterine [sic] Device is alleged to have caused serious pelvic infections
resulting in hospitalizations, tubal damage, infertility, and hysterectomies. It is also alleged
to have caused unplanned pregnancies ending in abortions, miscarriages, systic abortions,
tubal or ectopic pregnancies, and full-term deliveries. If you or a friend have had a similar
experience do not assume it is too late to take legal action against the Shield's manufacturer.
Our law firm is presently representing women on such cases. The cases are handled on a
contingent fee basis of the amount recovered. If there is no recovery, no legal fees are owed
by our clients.
Id. at 4588-89.
Id. at 4589.
" OHIO CODE OF PROF. Rasp. DISCIPLINARY RULE [hereinafter cited as DR] 2-106(C) prohibits
contingent-fee arrangements for criminal cases, while DR 2-101(A) states that "[a] lawyer shall not,
on behalf of himself, his partner, associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, use,
or participate in the use of, any form of public communication containing a false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim." Id. at 4589 n.3.
" DR 2-101(B) states that information contained in advertisements must be presented "in a dignified
manner without the use of drawings, illustrations,...." The rule also provides that the information
used must conform to a list of 20 items. Id. at 4589 n.4.
" DR 2-103(A); DR 2-104(A). Id. at 4589.
22DR 2-101(B)(15) requires that advertisements relating to contingent fee rates must disclose
"whether percentages are computed before or after deduction of court costs and expenses." The appellee's
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1986
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The complaints resulted in a hearing before a panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of Ohio. The panel
concluded that the appellant's advertisements were indeed in violation of numerous
disciplinary rules and recommended that Zauderer receive a public reprimand as
punishment.23 In support of this conclusion, the panel found that Zauderer's advertisements violated the rules in five respects. The panel agreed with the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel that the drunken driving advertisement was misleading, but
founded the claim of deception on the failure to disclose to the reader that, if
a case resulted in a plea bargain, the client could be found guilty and would
nonetheless be liable for the legal fees involved. 24 With respect to the Dalkon Shield
advertisement, the panel concluded that the illustration of the device, as well as
the failure to point out the potential liability for court costs in the event of an
unsuccessful suit, were both in violation of the rules." Finally, the panel reasoned
that since the advertisement amounted to a form of self-recommendation, and the
appellant received clients in response to that form of solicitation, Zauderer's Dalkon
Shield ad had consequently violated two other rules. The Board subsequently adopted
the panel's conclusions but recommended to the Supreme Court of Ohio that
Zauderer's punishment be increased to indefinite suspension from the practice of
16
law .
The Supreme Court of Ohio agreed with the Board's conclusions, as set forth
in the 1984 opinion of Disciplinary Counsel v. Zauderer."7 In holding that the
disciplinary rules are not in conflict with the first amendment, the state court referred to the United States Supreme Court's decisions of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona2
and In re R.M.J. 9 and indicated that the rules could constitutionally prohibit deceptive advertising and may restrict nondeceptive advertising in the presence of a compelling state interest." In reference to the specific provisions of the rules at issue,
the court summarily provided justifications for the restrictions. The court's opinion pointed out that it was proper to prohibit assertions of expertise in the absence
of methods that verify such claims.' Restrictions insuring the clarity of contingentfee arrangements and preventing unsolicited self recommendation also served a
legitimate state interest. Finally, the court noted that the deceptive nature of the
appellant's advertisements warranted the application of the rule prohibiting the in-

complaint alleged the Dalkon Shield advertisement failed to notify the reader that court costs might
be assessed from the losing party, and the claim regarding legal fees was thus "deceptive" and in viola-

tion of DR 2-101(A). Id. See supra note 18.
21 Zauderer, at 4589.
Id.
Id. at 4589-90.
26 Id.
27 Zauderer, 10 Ohio St. 3d 44, 461 N.E.2d 883.
11 Bates, 433 U.S. 350.
24

21

" In re R.M.J., 609 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 191 (1982).

3"

Zauderer, 10 Ohio St. 3d at 47-48, 461 N.E.2d at 886.
Id. at 48, 461 N.E.2d at 887.
I,
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clusion of false and misleading information. Having dispensed with the constitutionality of applying the disciplinary rules to the appellant, the court issued a public
reprimand.3 2
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed
in part the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio.33 In a five to three decision,
with Justice Powell taking no part, the Court held that attorney advertising may
be regulated to the extent that such restrictions prohibit the dissemination of false,
deceptive, or misleading information. 3 Although the Court found that the legal
advice and the illustration contained in appellant's advertisements were not false
or deceptive, it chose not to vacate the public
reprimand, as certain aspects of the
3
advertisements were actually misleading.
The majority opinion, authored by Justice White, was joined by Justices
Blackmun and Stevens.36 Justice Brennan submitted a dissenting opinion, joined
by Justice Marshall, expressing disapproval of Justice White's conclusion that
disclosure requirements regarding contingent-fee arrangements are rationally related
to the states' purpose of preventing consumer deception. The dissent also disapproved
of the majority's dismissal of a claim that the appellant was denied the protections
of procedural due process. 3 Justice O'Connor also authored a dissenting opinion,
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, which took issue with Justice
White's holding that Ohio's prophylactic restraints on all unsolicitated legal ad38
vice, and on the use of illustrations in advertisements, were unconstitutional.
III.
A.

PRIOR LAW

The "Commercial Speech Exception" to First Amendment Protection

The commercial speech doctrine in its present form is the result of relatively
recent developments in constitutional law. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision
of Bigelow v. Virginia39 in 1975, the prevailing view was that commercial speech
was the exception to first amendment free speech protections, rather than the rule.
In 1942, the holding in Valentine v. Chrestensen ° affirmed the notion that the
Court was not ready to extend the first amendment right of free speech to communications designed to achieve some form of financial gain for the speaker. In

32

Id.

Zauderer, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4587.
Id. at 4588.
" Id. at 4587.
36 Id. at 4588.
Id. at 4595.
" Id. at 4600.
Bigelow v. Virginia, 213 Va. 191, 191 S.E.2d 173 (1972), vacated and remanded, 413 U.S.
909 (1973), aff'd on reconsideration,214 Va. 341, 200 S.E.2d 680 (1973), rev'd, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
" Valentine v. Chrestensen, 122 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1941), rev'd, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
"
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Valentine, the Court upheld an ordinance which prohibited the distribution of commercial hand bills and circulars in the streets of New York City.' The opinion
acknowledged that the first amendment guards against the complete suppression
of most forms of communication in the public streets, yet the Court concluded
that "the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely
commercial advertising."" In effect the decision in Valentine had drawn a distinction between speech of a commercial nature and that which is of noncommercial
character.
The commercial speech exception would stand firm on the distinction set forth
in Valentine for more than thirty years, until the Court embarked upon a course
of decisions which eroded that principle. During that period of time between the
holdings of Valentine in 1942 and Bigelow in 1975, the Court continued to strengthen
the precedent for the commercial speech exception in cases such as Breard v. City
of Alexandria. 3 In Breard, the Court affirmed the appellant's conviction for violation of a municipal ordinance which prohibited house-to-house solicitation that was
neither requested nor invited.44 The Court in Breard found that the ordinance served
the legitimate purpose of sanctioning an "obnoxious" form of solicitation and did
not abridge, among other things, the appellant's rights of free speech or free press
guaranteed by the first amendment.s The Court's decision of Breard reaffirmed
that speech of a commercial nature would not be afforded the same protection
46
as that which preserves traditional noncommercial speech.

B.

The Development of the Commercial Speech Doctrine

In Bigelow v. Virginia, the Court seized upon the opportunity to cast aside
the old notion that speech of a commercial nature is not entitled to the same
privileges extended to noncommercial expression. By its decision in Bigelow, the
Court overturned the conviction of the editor of a Virginia newspaper for violation
of a state statute prohibiting the sale or circulation of any publication which encouraged the procurement of an abortion."7 The violation of this statute resulted
from the publication of an advertisement in the appellant's newspaper which an-

Valentine, 316 U.S. at 55.
,' Id. at 54.
,' Breard v. City of Alexandria, 217 La. 820, 47 So. 2d 553 (1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
4 Breard, 341 U.S. at 624-25.
Id. at 644-45.
With respect to the different treatments of commercial and noncommercial speech, the Court's
opinion in Breard indicated no deviation from the previous distinction. The Court stated as follows:
This kind of distinction is said to be protected because the mere fact that money is made
out of the distinction does not bar the publications from First Amendment protection. We
agree that the fact that periodicals are sold does not put them beyond the protection of the
First Amendment. The selling, however, brings into the transaction a commercial feature.
Id. at 641-42 (footnotes omitted).
4 Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 829.
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nounced the services and location of an abortion clinic in New York.4 8 In reversing
the lower court's decision, the United States Supreme Court held that the Virginia
Supreme Court had erred in placing speech of a "purely commercial nature" outside the zone of protected forms of speech. 9 The Court's opinion further suggested
that while commercial speech may not deserve protection equivalent to that given
noncommercial speech, some degree of protection is warranted." Because commercial advertising serves a function of disseminating economic information "of
potential interest and value to a diverse audience," it follows that some degree
of first amendment protection is in the public interest.' However, the Court declined
to delineate the scope and extent of that protection on this occasion. 2 One commentator suggested that the Court's restraint in commenting further on this issue
was based on the notion that the holding in Bigelow resulted primarily from an
analysis of the ideological content of the abortion advertisement rather than its
commercial content. 3 Consequently, the Court was not willing to explicitly overrule Valentine but indicated that this earlier decision was strictly limited to its facts.,'
Nevertheless, the decision in Bigelow established the basis for the recognition that
commercial speech in the form of advertising deserves some degree of first amendment protection.
In the year which followed the decision in Bigelow, the Court faced another
opportunity to address the commercial speech doctrine in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc." The case of VirginiaPharmacy involved a Virginia statute which declared the advertisement of prescription
drug prices by pharmacists to be unprofessional and illegal conduct. 6 Justice
Blackmun authored the majority opinion, which affirmed the district court's declaration that the Virginia statute at issue was unconstitutional. Following a balancing
test implied in Bigelow,"7 the Court found that a consumer's interest in the unimpaired flow of commercial information weighed heavier than a state's interest in
"maintaining a high degree of professionalism on the part of licensed pharmacists." 58

Id. at 812.
,9 Id. at 818.
'

IId.
Id. at 822.
,2 Id. at 825-26.

Note, supra note 6, at 737-38.
I4
Id.
" Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
Id. at 749-50.
The Court in Bigelow adopted a balancing test which was first employed in Pittsburgh Press
Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973). The test was stated as follows:
Any First Amendment interest which might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial
proposal and which might arguably outweigh the governmental interest altogether absent when
the commercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidental to a
valid limitation or economic activity.
Id. at 383.
" Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 766.
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In the view of Justice Blackmun, the state is not justified in totally suppressing
the dissemination of truthful information regarding lawful activities." Although
the opinion did not present a detailed analysis of the scope of the protection to
be extended to commercial advertising as a form of expression, Justice Blackmun
suggested that state regulation could constitutionally restrict the time, place, and
manner of such advertising and could proscribe advertisements that are false or
60
misleading.
The holding in Virginia Pharmacy was significant to the development of first
amendment protection for speech activities located outside the realm of noncommercial expression. The immediate impact of the decision would not, however, affect
the more narrow aspects of commercial speech, such as those which relate to professional services in general. Justice Blackmun cautioned that the decision reached
in Virginia Pharmacy was of limited application and should only be interpreted
in the context of advertising by pharmacists. 6 ' In a footnote to the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun clarified the applicability of the holding as follows:
We stress that we have considered in this case the regulation of commercial advertising by pharmacists. Although we express no opinion as to other professions,
the distinctions, historical and functional, between professions may require consideration of quite different factors. Physicians and lawyers, for example, do not
dispense standardized products; they render professional services of almost infinite
variety, with the enhanced possibility for confusion and deception if they were to
undertake certain kinds of advertising. 2
These fears expressed by Justice Blackmun, with respect to advertising by attorneys,
would restrain the Court in subsequent cases from allocating the same degree of
protection for attorney advertising as that extended to general commercial advertising in Virginia Pharmacy. In the following term, however, the Court would begin
to formulate a new policy toward attorney advertising with the decision of Bates
63
v. State Bar of Arizona.
C. A New Attitude Toward Lawyer Advertising
Bates reached the United States Supreme Court in 1977 as an appeal by two
attorneys who received disciplinary sanctions for violation of a disciplinary rule
of the Supreme Court of Arizona which made illegal any form of advertising by
attorneys.64 The appellants in this case advertised the availability of legal services
provided by their legal clinic and the fact that those services could be performed
for "very reasonable fees. '6 5 The appellants' advertisement also listed a number
19Id. at 773.
61

Id. at 771.

62

Id. at 773.
Id. at 773 n.25.

63

Bates, 433 U.S. 350.

61

1"Id.at 358.
61

Id. at 354.
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of fees for routine legal services such as divorce, legal separation, adoption, and
bankruptcy." The majority of the Court, led by Justice Blackmun, held that the
of protecapplication of the disciplinary rules to the two attorneys was in violation
67
tions afforded by the first amendment to commercial speech.
Justice Blackmun's opinion, which relied to a large degree on the rationale
underlying Virginia Pharmacy, focused primarily on the broad nature of the Arizona
Supreme Court's disciplinary rules and the importance of an individual's right to
the unrestrained flow of consumer information. The opinion suggested that the
holding in Bates "might be said to flow a fortiori" from the principles stated in
Virginia Pharmacy, and "[l]ike the Virginia Statutes, the disciplinary rule serves
to inhibit the free flow of commercial information and to keep the public in
ignorance."'68 The Court further suggested that, with this significant interest at stake,
prophylactic restraints on attorney advertising such as those enacted by the Supreme
Court of Arizona cannot be sustained. 69 The Court found that because commercial
speech deserves some uncertain degree of protection and attorney advertising implicates a form of expression important to both the consumer and the attorney,
0
then a blanket suppression of this type of commercial speech is unconstitutional.
In support of this conclusion, Justice Blackmun balanced the public's interest in
consumer information against a number of justifications asserted in defense of the
Arizona Supreme Court's disciplinary rule.' Justice Blackmun dismissed the claims
made in support of the Arizona rule, indicating that concerns about the potentially
adverse effects of authorizing attorney advertising were essentially unfounded. 2
In effect, the Court had held that advertising by lawyers falls within the zone of
commercial speech protection established in Virginia Pharmacy.7 3 However, Justice
Blackmun was careful to emphasize the narrow scope of the holding in Bates. The
decision merely justified the advertisement of fees charged for routine legal services
but provided no guidance for the promotion of "non-routine" legal services."
Although the holding in Bates signaled a new approach to be taken in review
of restrictions on lawyer advertising, the Court's opinion indicated that states were
not powerless to regulate such advertising." Justice Blackmun suggested that states
could continue to proscribe false, misleading, or deceptive advertising and would
16Id. at 385.
1' Id.
61 Id.
69Id.
'O Id.
' Id.

at 384.
at 365.
at 383.
at 367-79.

, The concerns which were raised in support of the disciplinary rule included the potential negative
impact of advertising on the quality and integrity of professionalism; the propensity for misleading
and deceptive advertising; the encouragement of fraudulent and frivolous litigation; increases in legal
costs; and problems associated with enforcement of restrictions on attorney advertising. Id.
11Id. at 383-84.
74 Id.
"1 Id. at 383.
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be justified in placing "reasonable restrictions" on the time, place, and manner
of advertisement.16 The Court's opinion, nonetheless, guarded against extension
of its holding to the various forms that attorney advertising might take or the
mediums through which the advertisements would be conveyed. As an example,
Justice Blackmun clarified that questions surrounding the regulation of claims made
by a lawyer about the quality of services rendered could not be resolved in this
instance." Furthermore, it was pointed out that the issue of "in-person solicitation" by attorneys was not present in this case and not addressed by the opinion."
The problems associated with the use of electronic media also remained unresolved. 9
In essence, the Court recognized unanswered questions and issues regarding attorney advertising as a means of stressing the narrow applicability of the holding
in Bates.
Following the decision in Bates, the degree of protection afforded attorney
advertising remained vague and ambiguous. According to one writer, this uncertainty resulted in considerable variation in the nature of the rules subsequently
adopted by the states. "° Another commentator noted that, after the Court's decision in Bates, a majority of jurisdictions chose to interpret the holding narrowly
and reacted by modifying their rules in close resemblance to the rules proposed
by the American Bar Association in 1977.8 ' The attorney advertising cases which
followed Bates involved modified rules and enabled the Court to expand upon the
principles announced by its decision. It is apparent from the restraint demonstrated
by Justice Blackmun's opinion that defining the scope and extent of permissible
state regulation in the area of attorney advertising requires a rather sensitive caseby-case analysis. The decisions subsequent to Bates made relatively narrow contributions in defining the scope of permissible regulation, an indication that the
Court was cognizant of the discriminate analytical approach required for such an
intricate melange of state and individual interests.
One year after Bates was decided, the Supreme Court was given another
opportunity to define the limits of state regulation of lawyer solicitation in two
76

Id. at 383-84.

77 Id.
73 Id.
7" Id.

at 366.
at 384.

Note, supra note 6, at 742-44. The uncertainty about the permissible scope of attorney advertising regulation after the Bates decision did not immediately influence the states to revise their approaches. It has been pointed out that thirty states followed a restrictive regulatory approach which
specified the particular forms of attorney advertising that would be allowed. Nearly all of the remaining
states adopted a much less restrictive approach, which merely required that lawyer advertisements not
be false, misleading, or deceptive. Id at 729-31 nn.12-15.
1' Boden, supra note 9, at 554-55. The approach that was ultimately adopted by the American
Bar Association in August, 1977, was known as Proposal A, which embodied the restrictive approach
to attorney advertising. This was the approach most favored by the states following the decision of
Bates. Note, supra note 6, at 742-43. See also supra note 80.
so
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cases decided the same day, In re Primus8 2 and Ohralik v. State Bar of Ohio.83

The case of In re Primus involved an attorney who received a public reprimand
by the South Carolina Supreme Court for violations of that court's disciplinary
rules. 8" The appellant's alleged violation occurred when she sent a letter to a woman
informing her that free legal services could be provided by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) for representation of the woman in a possible lawsuit against
a doctor who had sterilized her.85 The lawsuit was to be based on the premise that
the doctor had sterilized this woman, as well as other women in similar situations,
after suggesting that the continued stream of Medicaid payments to her depended
upon her consent to the treatment.86 A complaint filed with the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of South Carolina
(Board) resulted in a determination that the appellant's letter soliciting the woman
was in violation of the Disciplinary Rules of the Supreme Court of South Carolina8 7
and led to the issuance of a private reprimand. 8 The Board's findings and conclusions were adopted by the South Carolina Supreme Court, and the sanction was
increased to a public reprimand.8 9
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, a majority of the justices found
that the appellant's public reprimand could not be sustained.9" In an opinion
authored by Justice Powell, the Court indicated that, while the state is justified
in its concern for the evils of "undue influence, overreaching, misrepresentation,
invasion of privacy" and other possible abuses hypothetically posed by attorney
advertising, 9' the restrictions imposed on mailings by the ACLU and its attorney
did not promote a legitimate and significant interest.92 The Court found that, because
the appellant's solicitation was not compelled by the possibility of personal pecuniary
gain, the evils feared by the State were not present.9 3 With the involvement of the
ACLU in these activities, the Court also found that the form of speech at stake
in Primus involved an "associational aspect," 9" and as a form of political expression it falls "within the generous zone of First Amendment protection reserved

In re Smith, 268 S.C. 259, 233 S.E.2d 301 (1977), rev'd, In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
Ohralik v. State Bar of Ohio, 48 Ohio St.2d 217, 357 N.E.2d 1097 (1976), aff'd, 436 U.S.
447 (1978).
Primus, 436 U.S. at 414-19.
" Id.
at 417.
"

36

Id.

" The Board determined that the appellant had violated DR 2-103(D)(5)(a) and (c) and DR

2-104(a)(5). Id. at 418-19.
11 Id. at 420-21.
$9

Id.

Id.
9 Id.
91 Id.
I1
Id.
91 Id.

at
at
at
at
at

439.
432.
432-38.
422.
438 n.32.
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for associational freedoms." 95 In essence, the Court pointed out a distinction between speech of a purely commercial nature and expression which seeks to further
an ideological goal. The opinion also suggested that the regulation of ideological
expression deserves a heightened level of scrutiny, as "[i]n the context of political
expression and association, however, a state must regulate with significantly greater
precision." '9 6 Thus, Primus represented a new dimension by which attorney advertising restrictions would be scrutinized. The Court nonetheless had the opportunity
to further develop its policy towards purely commercial speech that same day in
Ohralik v. State Bar of Ohio.97
The appellant in Ohralik was an attorney who received an indefinite suspension from the practice of law for the in-person solicitation of two victims of an
automobile accident. 98 Both victims originally agreed to retain the lawyer on a
contingent-fee basis, but they subsequently discharged the appellant as their
attorney.9 9 The victims filed formal complaints against the appellant, which were
ultimately received by a State bar grievance committee following settlement of the
attorney's claim against the victims for breach of contract. The complaints resulted
in the indefinite suspension of the attorney by the Ohio Supreme Court. The attorney appealed the suspension to the United States Supreme Court, which held
that the application of the State's disciplinary rules to the appellant was constitutional."'
The Court in Ohralik affirmed the appellant's indefinite suspension, placing
much reliance on the distinction drawn in Primus between solicitation for and notfor pecuniary gain. In effect, the Court had accepted the proposition that the incentive of financial benefit that might be gained from in-person solicitation is "inherently conductive" to the forms of abuse which presumably result, such as overreaching, undue influence, and misrepresentation.'"' Justice Powell's opinion indicated that the circumstances present in Ohralik created a need for preventative
measures such as those adopted by the State.' 2 Hence, the Court found that the
proscription of in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain was supported by a legitimate
and substantial state interest, which is appropriate where the potential for abuse
is significant.' 03 With the decision of Ohralik, the Court fashioned a separate constitutional standard involving a lower level of scrutiny to be applied to state regulation of in-person attorney solicitation.' 4

11 Id. at 431.

at 438.

96

Id.

"

Ohralik, 436 U.S. 447.
Id. at 452-53.
Id. at 449-54.

"

100 Id.
"I: Id. at 463-64.

102Id. at 464.
"I Id. at 462-65.
104 Id. at

457.
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Reading Primus and Ohralik together, it is apparent that the Court had not
established a substantially clearer picture of solicitation that may be proscribed
by the states or solicitation that deserves some degree of protection. However, the
decisions do indicate that the proscription of attorney solicitation for pecuniary
gain is appropriate, unless that proscription has implicated countervailing and more
significant rights of the attorney or client. It is important to understand that Primus
and Ohralik not only provided guidance for situations such as those presented by
the respective cases but also affirmed principles that survived the earlier decisions
of Virginia Pharmacy and Bates. These basic principles, reiterated in Primus and
Ohralik, again focused on the states' legitimate interests in proscribing false and
misleading advertising and imposing reasonable restrictions as to the time, place,
and manner of advertising.' 5
In 1982, the Court availed itself of the opportunity to scrutinize the "laundry
list"'
approach to regulating attorney advertising in the case of In re R.M.J.'"7
R.M.J. centered on the activities of an attorney who advertised the establishment
of his practice in St. Louis in the newspapers and yellow pages of the phone directory for the local area. The attorney also mailed announcement cards to a preselected
list of addresses. 8 The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the activities of the
attorney and held that his advertisements were in violation of the disciplinary rules
by including information which was not authorized by the court-approved "laundry list" and by listing areas of concentration differently than the wording authorized
by the rules.'0 9 The State Supreme Court also held that he had violated a disciplinary
rule which specified persons to which announcements could be sent." ,oThe attorney
was consequently issued a private reprimand which was appealed to the United
States Supreme Court."'
't 6

In a majority opinion written by Justice Powell, the Supreme Court reversed
the findings of the Missouri court, holding that the disciplinary rules as applied
to the appellant were unconstitutional." 2 On this occasion, the Court was able to
formulate the most extensive summarization to date of the commercial speech doctrine as applied to the advertising of professional services. The touchstone of this
,o Primus, 436 U.S. at 438; Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 462.
106 The "laundry list" approach has been adopted by a number of states as a means of guiding
attorneys who wish to advertise the areas of law in which their practice is concentrated. The states
adopting this approach designate the proper words or phrases that may be used to describe the areas
of concentration, i.e., "administrative law," "criminal law," "property law," "tort law," etc. Note,
In re R.M.J.: The Scope of Lawyer Advertising Expands, 1983 UTAH L. REV. 99, 10810; Note, supra
note 6, at 744-45 nn.121-24 and accompanying text.
191.
"07 R.M.J., 455 U.S.
" Id. at 196-97.
1o9 Id. at 197.
110 The rule regarding the mailing of announcements specified that they could only be sent to
"lawyers, clients, personal friends and relatives." Id. at 196.
Id. at 198.

Id. at 207.
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decision lies in the determination of whether or not the advertising in question is
truthful and related to a lawful activity.'1 3 Building on this basic inquiry, the Court
noted that a state may retain regulatory authority over all types of attorney advertising, provided that the regulation is "no broader than reasonably necessary to
prevent the deception" that has been associated with this form of commercial
speech."' The opinion implies that while there may exist a substantial interest in
the state regulation of commercial speech by attorneys, the restrictions must be
narrowly drawn and drafted with precision." ' In effect, the Court in R.M.J. severely
limited the ability of the states to further proscribe the broad aspects of attorney
advertising.
In applying the premises of the commercial speech doctrine in its newly adopted
form, Justice Powell concluded that the information included by the appellant in
the advertisements and announcement cards was neither misleading nor inherently
misleading. Because the appellant's claims were, in fact, truthful, the Court found
that the Missouri rules at issue were overly broad and unconstitutional." 6 The Court
further found that one of the rules was unacceptable because it had not been proven
that the appellant's use of words not contained in the "laundry list" carried an
increased potential for deception or threatened any significant state interest."I7 The
opinion emphasized that states should follow a least restrictive means approach,
as suggested for commercial speech regulation in CentralHudsor Gas and Electric
Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York," in the adoption of advertising restrictions to insure that truthful and undeceptive advertising is not unnecessarily restricted." ' The effect of the decision of R.M.J. would appear to be
that attorneys are justified in advertising the areas in which their practice concentrates, in their own words, provided that the description is not false or misleading.
However, R.M.J. did not resolve the question initially posed in Bates regarding2
qualitative assertions as to special areas of expertise held by an attorney.1 0
Nonetheless, the decision of In re R.M.J. provided the most refined version of
"I Id. at 203.
114
"I

6

Id.

Id. at 203-04.
Id. at 205-06.

Id. at 205.
Central Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
'" R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 206. The Court in R.M.J. relied in part on the decision of Central
Hudson. In Central Hudson, the Court held that an electric utility may not be prohibited from the
practice of promotional advertising, provided that the advertising is nondeceptive. Central Hudson,
447 U.S. 557. To arrive at this conclusion, the Court in Central Hudson formulated a four-pronged
test for ascertaining the constitutionality of regulation which restricts nondeceptive advertising. Id. at
566. First, it must be determined whether or not the commercial speech at issue "concern[s] lawful
activity and [is not) misleading." Id. Second, the purported state interest underlying the regulation
must be substantial. Id. If the first two questions are answered in the affirmative, then the regulation
must "directly advance the governmental interest asserted," and the regulation must be no more restrictive than necessary to support that interest. Id.
-20 Bates, 433 U.S. 350, 366. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
'
'
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the commercial speech doctrine to that point and prior to the Court's decision of
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel.21

IV.

SUPREME COURT ANALYSIS

At the outset of the opinion in Zauderer, the Court pointed out that the commercial speech doctrine as applied to attorney advertising rests on a firm foundation established by the decisions of Bates through R.M.J. Accepting the propositions on which those cases relied, Justice White acknowledged that the outcome
in Zauderer would depend upon the doctrine's application to the regulations in
question, which were summarized as taking on three distinct forms: (1) the proscription of unsolicited legal advice contained in advertisements; (2) the prohibition on the use of illustrations in attorney advertising; and (3) the propriety of
disclosure requirements imposed on the advertisement of contingent-fee
arrangements.' 22
The Court's analysis of Ohio's disciplinary rules initially focused on the interests served by restrictions against solicitation and against accepting clients responding to advertisements which include some form of legal advice.' 23 While recognizing that the state is not powerless in prohibiting forms of attorney advertising that
are conducive to "vexatious conduct," Justice White noted an important distinction between the outcome of Ohralik and the facts of Zauderer.'24 The holding
in Ohralik, heavily relied on by the appellee, justified the state's strict regulation
of a form of solicitation that is inherently dangerous by its very nature.' 25 Because
print advertising creates much less of a risk than face-to-face solicitation, Ohio's
of all forms of solicitation was not necessarily reinforced by
blanket suppression
26
Ohralik.'
Justice White dismissed a number of contentions by the appellee in support
of the prophylactic ban on unsolicited legal advice. First, the opinion rejected the
appellee's insistence that any regulation short of a total ban on all solicitation would
not adequately protect the public and the courts from a deluge of meritless litigation.' 27 The Court found that there is no reason to believe that civil litigation should
be discouraged as an iniquity of our society. Furthermore, advertising that is neither
false nor misleading serves the valuable function of informing the public of their
legal rights. Second, the Court disagreed with the appellee's argument that blanket
suppression is warranted by enforcement problems associated with distinguishing

121

Zauderer, 53 U.S.L.W. 4587.
IId. at 4591.

,2' Id.
12

Id.

125

Id.
I2 at 4591-92.
/d.
/d. at 4592.

'
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between deceptive and nondeceptive attorney advertisements.' 28 In relation to the
appellant's Dalkon Shield advertisement, the Court pointed out that it was not
difficult to confirm the truthfulness of the statements made by Zauderer. Justice
White also suggested that claims made in legal advertisements are not necessarily
any more complex, or more conducive to misinterpretation, than other forms of
general commercial advertising." 9
With respect to Ohio's prophylactic suppression of unsolicited legal advice,
the Court in effect employed the balancing test that was initially applied in Bigelow
and Virginia Pharmacy. ' Arriving at much the same conclusion reached in the
earlier cases, the Court held that the interest in the free flow of commercial information to consumers far outweighs a state's interest in the efficient and simplified
application of prohibitions against false or deceptive commercial advertising.",
Reasoning that blanket bans are unacceptable as applied to attorney advertising,
as well as commercial advertising at-large, the Court displayed the desire to continue to whittle away at the distinction between the two, originally formed in Virginia
Pharmacy.3 2 The Court expressed no reservations in placing on the state the burden
of discriminating between deceptive and nondeceptive advertising, with the added
responsibility of drafting regulations with precision, to insure that truthful and nonmisleading advertising will not be suppressed.' This aspect of the opinion in
Zauderer is consistent with the Court's rationale in Bigelow and Virginia Pharmacy and is a sign that prophylactic restraints on any form of attorney advertising
will be met with greater skepticism in the future.
After dispensing with the state's prohibitions on legal advice and solicitation,
the review of the disciplinary rules in question turned to the restrictions against
the use of illustrations such as that found in the appellant's Dalkon Shield advertisement. Because the appellant's line drawing served much the same function as
the advice in providing information about legal rights, the Court found that first
amendment protection must be extended to the use of an illustration as if it were
"verbal commercial speech."' 13 4 Consequently, Justice White applied the least restrictive means analysis first used in the context of attorney advertising in R.M.J. 33
With this analysis, the Court was unpersuaded that the appellee satisfied the burden
of proving that a total ban on the use of illustrations served a legitimate and compelling interest. Justice White could not accept the argument that illustrations, any
more than printed legal advice, are inherently misleading or difficult to police.2 6
122 Id.
129 Id.
23

See supra notes 57-58, 70-72 and accompanying text.

'"

Zauderer, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4593.
Id. at 4592-93. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.

" Zauderer, 53
131 Id.
'

U.S.L.W. at 4593.

ld. See supra note 119.
Zauderer, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4593-94.
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Having considered the alternative of utilizing a case-by-case analysis of illustrations used in lawyer advertisements, the Court could not agree with the proposition
that Ohio had invoked the least restrictive means of assuring that these illustrations
are not deceptive.' 37 In this respect, the Court merely confirmed the teachings of
R.M.J. as a balanced approach to regulating the accuracy of the contents of legal
advertisements. The authority for this approach nonetheless follows from the basic
tenet of the commercial speech doctrine that survived the line of cases from Bates
through R.M.J.: the states may regulate attorney advertising only to the extent
necessary to prevent the inclusion of false, deceptive, or misleading information.
Following the discussion of the broader implications behind abrogation of Ohio's
prophylactic restraints, the Court's opinion shifted to the much narrower issues
surrounding disclosure requirements applied to attorney advertising. 39 In this section of the majority opinion, Justice White invoked a means-ends analysis to test
the weight of the State's interest supporting the disclosure requirements.' 39 It was
argued by the appellee that these requirements are designed to provide the reader
with important information regarding potential liability for court costs if a lawsuit
is unsuccessful.'" The Court concluded that the State demonstrated a rational relationship between the concerns for the prevention of consumer deception and the
use of disclosure requirements to abate those concerns."' However, the Court did
not ignore the appellant's contention that such requirements amount to a compulsion to speak and could lead to a chilling effect on commercial speech. In response
to this argument, the Court cautioned that disclosure requirements must not be
so restrictive that protected commercial speech is suppressed.' 2 Nonetheless, Justice
White found that the State's requirement to fully describe the implications of
contingent-fee arrangements was justified in light of the appellant's advertisements
and the potential for deception regarding the assessment of costs.' 3 In essence,
the Court was employing a less exacting standard of review for state regulation
of attorney advertising by means of disclosure requirements than for the broader
restrictions on commercial speech.'"" These requirements satisfied the Court's
demands in Bates and R.M.J. that regulations be drafted with precision and must
be no broader than necessary to achieve the purported goal. Hence, the disclosure
requirements represented what the Court had been asking for since Bates-an alternative to broad, sweeping restraints on attorney advertising.
Justice White briefly dismissed the appellant's claim that he had been deprived
of procedural due process by a change in the theory underlying one of the charges
Id. at 4594.
iS Id.

"'

Id. at 4594 n.14.
Id. at 4594.
I,
.1 Id.
I4
Id.
Id. n.15.
144 Id.
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in the original complaint.'" Zauderer contended that alleged deception in the
drunken driving advertisement was initially based on the theory that he proposed
to offer an illegal contingent-fee arrangement in a criminal case.' 6 However, the
appellant argued, the panel commissioned by the Board grounded this allegation
of deception on a different theory: the advertisement had not disclosed that, in
the event of a plea bargain, the client might be found guilty and at the same time
would be liable for the attorney's fees.'4 7 The Court's opinion swept aside the contention that the change in theory deprived Zauderer of ample notice and opportunity to respond to the charges. It was sufficient that the Board's recommendations notified the appellant that he would be required to respond to the charges
before the Supreme Court of Ohio.'' 8 This point in the majority opinion would
provide the stimulus for a most fervent dissent by Justice Brennan.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan directed his attack at Justice White's rulings
with regard to perceived due process violations. First, Justice Brennan took issue
with Ohio's disclosure requirements which, in his view, were so "vaguely expressed"
that an attorney acting in compliance with the rule could not be expected to fully
understand what is actually required." 9 In stressing the impropriety of the disclosure
requirements, and consequently Justice White's ruling on them, Justice Brennan
insisted that the rule which requires the attorney to publicize contingent-fee percentage rates does not further a significant state interest.5 0 He added that Ohio's enforcement of the rule against the appellant forced the attorney to anticipate what
will satisfy the state's requirement of "full disclosure of the terms" of representation, even though the disciplinary rules do not detail what amounts to sufficient
disclosure.' 5 ' As a result, Justice Brennan concluded, the Supreme Court of Ohio
had imposed against the appellant a standard so obscure that it should be considered void for vagueness. Even if the rule specifically stipulated that full disclosure
is necessary, such a mandate would be unduly burdensome and would create a
potential chilling effect on commercial speech.'" However, Justice Brennan argued,
Ohio's disclosure requirement did not put the appellant on notice that certain
elements were necessary for full disclosure, hence the rule should not have been
enforced against the appellant in such an unpredictable manner." 3 In light of the
rule's ambiguity, the public reprimand issued to the appellant worked a serious
deprivation of his liberty and property interests protected by constitutional due
process by publicizing his "unethical" behavior with "casual indifference to the
gravity of the injury inflicted."' 5 4
,"I Id. at 4595.
N6

'"1

Id.
Id. at 4589.

Id. at 4595.
Id. at 4595-96.
Id. at 4596-97.
' Id. at 4597.
52 Id.
Id. at 4598.
'" Id. at 4599.
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The second point of departure for Justice Brennan was with the majority opinion's dismissal of a procedural due process issue surrounding the appellee's change
in theory for the charge that the drunken driving advertisement had been misleading
and deceptive.'" Justice Brennan considered the change in theory to be without
reasonable notice of the specific charges that the appellant would need to refute. 56
He found little comfort in Justice White's assertion that the appellant was afforded
sufficient opportunity to dispute the Board's findings before the Ohio Supreme
Court.'" Because Zauderer had not been given a meaningful chance to present
evidence against the new theory, Justice Brennan reasoned, the appellant's rights
protected by procedural due process were violated.'"
The dissent authored by Justice O'Connor and joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Rehnquist challenged the Court's holding that Ohio had no constitutional authority for prohibiting the inclusion of truthful and nondeceptive information and advice in attorney advertising.'"9 Justice O'Connor's opinion reflected
a steadfast concern initially posed in Virginia Pharmacy by Justice Blackmun. 6
In essence, Justice O'Connor insisted that attorney advertising is so inherently
misleading and conducive to overreaching that states should not be foreclosed from
restricting any form or element of truthful attorney advertising.' 6 With respect
to the case at bar, Justice O'Connor contended that print advertising is "only one
step removed" from the in-person solicitation banned in Ohralik.'62 Since the
possibilities for "vexatious conduct" are almost as great when lawyers are permitted to offer legal advice through the print media, states have nearly as strong
an interest in regulating this form of attorney advertising.' 63 Justice O'Connor concluded that these legitimate and compelling state interests justified the regulation
of unsolicited legal advice that is so closely associated with an attorney's pecuniary
self-interest.' 64
The Court's decision in Zaudererheld important implications for the commercial speech doctrine as applied to attorney advertising. The holding in this case
confirmed the notion that the Court would maintain a strong suspicion of state
restrictions applied to truthful and nondeceptive attorney advertising. However,
Zauderer also appears to have provided more help in outlining the substance of
appropriate state regulation. Although Justice Brennan disputed the Court's ruling
on Ohio's disclosure requirements, there was no indication by any of the justices
that these requirements would not be proper, if carefully drawn and not unnecessarily

"'

15

'

Id.

Id. at 4599-600.
Id. at 4600.

Id.
Id. at 4600-02.
"o See supra notes 61 and 62 and accompanying text.
,61Zauderer, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4601.
"

162

Id.

,61Id. at 4600.
,6,Id. at 4601-02.
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burdensome. In regard to the O'Connor dissent, a minority of the justices continue
to echo the long-standing concerns about attorney advertising and its effect on professionalism and the integrity of client representation. Nonetheless, Zauderer teaches
that the Court desires to stay on the course set forth in Bates and R.M.J. affirming
the principle that attorney advertising will be permissible provided that it is truthful,
not misleading and nondeceptive.

V.

CONCLUSION

The result in Zauderer illustrates that the Court is beginning to address the
more narrow issues which pervade the regulation of lawyer advertising. Although
a minority of the justices still hold fears that for decades were emphasized by the
ABA, these concerns have not been equally persuasive of the majority. With
Zauderer, the Court continues to place lawyer advertising in the proper perspective
of first amendment free speech protections. The Court has reached a point at which
it will be able to focus its analysis in future cases toward the narrow avenues of
permissible state regulation, involving approaches such as disclosure requirements
and disclaimers of qualitative assertions imposed on attorney advertising. While
the Court maintained the desire to foreclose broad and sweeping regulation, it also
displayed a genuine interest in delineating proper means for the states to attain
legitimate regulatory goals. The decision of Zauderer reaffirmed the notion that
state regulation of attorney advertising must be narrow in scope and drafted with
utmost precision.
The recent Supreme Court decisions relevant to lawyer advertising demonstrate
that the issues presented involve not only matters of professional integrity and constitutional law, but also require consideration of the interests of the consumer in
the free flow of legal information. However, throughout the line of cases which
led to Zauderer, the Court has been somewhat consumed with the role that the
first amendment has played in the protection of attorney advertising and with fending
off persistent claims regarding adverse effects on the profession and the quality
of legal representation. As a result, the Court has yet to make its own predictions
as to the impact of the decisions in these cases, particularly with respect to the
consumer.
Zauderer marks an important juncture in the Supreme Court's approach towards
state regulation of lawyer advertising. At the present time, Zaudereris of minimal
guidance for the proper use of disclosure requirements and disclaimers, yet the
case is a significant step beyond past decisions which have only been able to focus
on the broader aspects of state regulation. The use of disclosure requirements appears to be the most effective way that states may insure that attorney advertising
is truthful and nondeceptive, without abridging the constitutional rights of the lawyer
or potential client. State regulation may very well evolve into compilations of
disclosure requirements aimed at producing particular results that further legitimate
interests. In the context of current state regulation, though, Zauderer represents
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol88/iss2/7
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a point at which the Supreme Court has begun to sharpen its scrutiny of state
restrictions, beyond the basic inquiry of whether such regulations insure that truthful
and nondeceptive advertising by attorneys is protected."

5

Brent P. Copenhaver

,61On June 10, 1985, the Supreme Court announced that it had vacated the judgment of Humphrey v. Committee on Professional Ethics, 53 U.S.L.W. 3868 (U.S. June 10, 1985), vacating and
remanding, 355 N.W.2d 565 (Iowa 1984) (to be remanded in light of Zauderer). In Humphrey, the
Iowa Supreme Court upheld a disciplinary rule which prohibited television advertising that contains
background sound, visual displays, more than one single nondramatic voice, or self-laudatory statements
even though the ads may not be misleading.
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